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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER VISITING ARMED FORCES:
RECONCILING THE CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION DISCONTINUITY
Many Americans once thought that members of the United
States armed forces were not accountable under the laws of the for-
eign nation where they were stationed.' Many Americans still be-
lieve that United States servicemen' should be subject only to the
laws of the United States for criminal acts committed in foreign
nations.3 In fact, such was the case in most countries where United
States forces were stationed during or immediately after the Second
World War.4 Since that time however, the situation has changed
considerably.5
Customary international law6 offers no solution as to which
State has primary criminal jurisdiction' over a visiting armed force
when both the host and sending nations8 assert their jurisdiction9
over an offender. As a result, a predicament often arises in the ab-
sence of a treaty or other agreement.' 0 The sending State may as-
1. Many letters from constituents and interested parties regarding U.S. retention of
jurisdiction over its visiting forces were submitted into the Congressional Record in July
1953 during debate on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 99 CONG. REC.
8737-41 (1953).
2. It is recognized that women are comprising an increasing percentage of today's
armed forces. However, in the interest of brevity, this Comment will refer to servicepeople in
the masculine form.
3. 99 CONG REC. 8737-41 (1953).
4. S. LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
LAW 26-29 (1971); 99 CONG. REC. 8764-65 (1953).
5. Agreements between two or more nations have been used to delineate rules for
criminal jurisdiction regarding visiting force members. See infra text accompanying notes
131-218.
6. Customary international law is defined as "a general practice accepted as law." J.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 60 (6th ed. 1963).
7. Jurisdiction as used in this Comment refers to the powers of a State to prescribe and
enforce rules of conduct.
8. The meaning of "sending," "receiving," and "host" nations is indicated by the fol-
lowing example. When the U.S. deploys a visiting force of Marines to Lebanon, the U.S. is
the sending State and Lebanon is the receiving State, host nation or territorial State.
9. When both nations have a recognized basis upon which to assert their claim, it is
said that concurrent jurisdiciton exists. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 160.
10. Stanger, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Visiting Armed Forces, 52 U.S. NAVAL WAR C.
INT'L L. STUDIES 1, 155 (1965).
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sert the need to maintain discipline and control over its forces at all
times and in all locations." Conversely, the receiving State may
assert its vital interests of maintaining public order and controlling
events which affect the safety of its populace.12 Any attempt to rec-
oncile these two diametrically opposed principles of jurisdiction
can result in international conflicts.
13
The extent of the problem regarding criminal jurisdiction over
visiting military forces is not always readily apparent. Insight into
the magnitude of the problem may be gained by examining a recent
Department of Defense report. 14 In a twelve month period, Ameri-
can military personnel reportedly committed 64,101 offenses in for-
eign nations. 5 Nearly 25,000 of these cases involved concurrent
jurisdiction.' 6 During this same period 43,609 American service
personnel were tried and convicted by foreign courts for violations
of the host nation's laws.' 7 When the total number of military per-
sonnel serving in foreign States is considered, the true proportions
of the jurisdictional problem may be seen.
When a member of a visiting armed force commits a criminal
act such as homicide, the act may violate the laws of both the send-
ing and the receiving nations.'" The stage is thus set for an interna-
tional confrontation should both nations assert jurisdiction to
prosecute the offender.' 9 If a status of forces agreement or other
treaty is in force, the problem may be resolved by reference to the
controlling document.2° In the event that no such agreements are
applicable, and concurrent jurisdiction exists, there is a discontinu-
ity in international law. 2' No rule prevails regarding which nation
should succeed in its jurisdictional claim or which basis of jurisdic-
!1. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 57; see also Stanger, supra note 10, at 84-85.
12. Stanger, supra note 10, at 4, 102.
13. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 9. The controversies arise primarily over which na-
tion has the right to first exercise jurisdiction over the offending member of the visiting force.
14. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF STATISTICS ON THE EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURIS-
DICTION BY FOREIGN TRIBUNALS OVER UNITED STATES PERSONNEL, 1 December 1980-30





18. For an example of such a conflict see Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957), dis-
cussed in detail infra at text accompanying notes 193-202.
19. See generaly Stanger, The Status of Forces, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDIC-
TION 74-75 (1961).
20. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 160-61.
21. Stanger, supra note 10, at 264.
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To fill this gap, this Comment will suggest that there exists a
need to codify international law into a convention regarding the
status of visiting armed forces. The discussion will initially focus
on the principles which have evolved regarding jurisdictional ques-
tions over visiting military units. These doctrines include territorial
principles, immunities, and the law of the flag. Illustrative cases
and incidents will be used to indicate the past and current status of
international law in this field. The utility and effectiveness of status
of forces agreements will also be reviewed with particular emphasis
on the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).23 Due
to its long usage and various salient attributes, the NATO SOFA
will be examined as a basis for a universally acceptable convention
on jurisdiction over visiting armed forces. The benefits such a con-
vention could provide as a means to lessen the problems and uncer-
tainties created when concurrent jurisdiction exists will then be
explored. Finally, this Comment will recommend that the United
States propose such a convention through the United Nations.
I. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is generally agreed that there are three primary sources of
international law: (1) recognized international conventions (also
known as treaties), (2) international custom, and (3) general princi-
ples of law recognized by most nations.24 Conventions are part of
the supreme law under the United States Constitution. 25 Custom-
ary international law is also a viable part of American jurispru-
22. See generally H. JACOBINI, INTERNATIONAL LAW 135-39 (rev. ed. 1968), indicating
there are five bases of jurisdiction for the enforcement of criminal law which are sometimes
recognized internationally: (1) the territorial principle, determining jurisdiction by reference
to the place where the offense is committed; (2) the nationality principle, where jurisdiction is
determined by the nationality of the accused; (3) the protective principle, determining juris-
diction by reference to the national interest injured by the offense; (4) the universality princi-
ple, where jurisdiction is determined by which state has custody of the accused; and (5) the
passive personality principle, determining jurisdiction by the nationality of the person
injured.
23. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Status of Forces Agreement, June 19,
1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter cited as NATO SOFA].
24. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38. According to the Statute of the Court of International Justice,
the primary sources of International law are:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rule ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. . . . Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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dence according to the Supreme Court's decision in the Paquete
Habana.26 General principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions have not been used as often as the first two sources.27 Reli-
ance on such principles requires comprehensive research in
comparative law, a task which discourages its use in the United
States.28
Although these sources of law are used daily in the interna-
tional arena, they do not necessarily offer solutions for all situa-
tions. In the absence of a treaty, customary international law offers
little assistance in resolving jurisdicitonal disputes concerning visit-
ing armed forces.29 Problems arise because of the conflicting bases
of criminal jurisdiction which have evolved in international law.3"
These divergent bases must be understood in order to comprehend
the nature of jurisdiction over visiting armed forces.
II. BASES OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER ARMED FORCES
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The status of military forces in the absence of an agreement is
one of the most controversial points in international law.3' The
controversy is fueled by disputes over which nation has the power
to try a member of a visiting force who has offended laws of the
host nation. There are two primary bases for criminal jurisdiction
over armed forces when customary international law is applied.32
These are: (1) territorial jurisdiction, and (2) the law of the flag.33
A. Territorial Jurisdiction
Territorial jurisdiction is an important basic attribute of a sov-
ereign State in international law.3" Generally, it provides that a
26. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The Court, in deciding that coastal fishing vessels were
exempt from capture as prizes of war, held that international law is part of U.S. law and that
in the absence of a treaty, legislative, or executive act, resort to customs and usages of civi-
lized nations was appropriate.
27. Carnahan, International Law in the United States Court of Military Appeals, 3 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 314-15 (1980).
28. Id at 315.
29. Stanger, supra note 10, at 109-10. In this event, territorial and law of the flag juris-
diction come into conflict.
30. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 9.
31. Id. at 11.
32. Beesley, The Law of the Flag, the Law of Extradition, the NA TO Status of Forces
Agreeement, and Their Application to Members of the United States Army National Guard, 15
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 183, 185 (1982).
33. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 11.
34. J. BRIERLY, supra note 6, at 162.
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State retains jurisdiction over all persons, things and acts within its
borders to the exclusion of other States.3 The host nation's juris-
diction may range from jurisdiction which is absolute to relatively
limited.36 The latter situation occurs when the host nation grants
some degree of foreign sovereign immunity to a visiting military
force,3" for example, where visiting NATO forces are stationed
under the NATO SOFA.
Introduction of a foreign military force into a host nation dur-
ing peacetime is often subject to an agreement between the two na-
tions involved.38 The agreement normally defines the rights and
obligations of the members of the visiting force.3 9 Where no formal
agreement exists, the gap must be filled, when necessary, by inter-
national law as applied by the courts.4 °
In the absence of an agreement, a sending nation often claims
immunity for the acts of its military personnel. The military com-
mander must maintain discipline or control over the visiting force
at all times to legitimately claim immunity.4 However, the host
nation can assert, with equal validity, that the foreign force is abso-
lutely subject to the laws of the receiving State.42 By claiming juris-
diction over a breach of the receiving nation's laws by a foreign
soldier, the host nation attempts to assert its absolute territorial sov-
ereignty.43 A clash of wills is the result."
1. Absolute Territorial Sovereignty. Under this theory, no for-
eign State is allowed to exercise its own sovereignty within the host
nation's territory. 5 Strict adherence to the absolute theory of terri-
torial sovereignty over a visiting armed force subjects force mem-
bers to complete jurisdiction of the host nation.46 Concomitantly, it
also takes effective control away from the commander of the visit-
ing force.47
35. Id.
36. Beesley, supra note 32, at 184.
37. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 17-18.
38. Beesley, supra note 32, at 184.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Stanger, supra note 10, at 84.
42. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 329.
43. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 17. Absolute territorial sovereignty, by definition,
permits only the territorial host to exert sovereignty within its boundaries. See infra text
accompanying notes 45-54.
44. Stanger, supra note 19, at 74-75.
45. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 17.
46. Id.
47. Stanger, supra note 10, at 84.
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The failure by a receiving nation to assert jurisdiction over a
breach of the law within its territory amounts to a violation of its
own sovereignty.48 In such a case, the host nation has the right to
grant or deny entry to friendly military forces.49 The host nation
also has a duty to determine the jurisdictional status of anyone
within its territory.5 ° In theory, the receiving nation could treat the
visiting military force members as ordinary foreigners. 5 However,
this theoretical standard has never prevailed.52 Efforts to assert the
territorial principle as the exclusive basis of jurisdiction have not
succeeded53 because almost all States extend their jurisdiction to
certain types of offenses committed outside their own territory.
5 4
2. Immunity From Jurisdiction. The opposite of a claim of
absolute territorial sovereignty as a basis for asserting jurisdiction is
a claim of immunity from jurisdiction.55 Claims of immunity are
usually based on the official character of the acts underlying the
alleged offense, or the status of the accused as an agent of the
State.56
Many of the acts of an armed forces member are carried out in
the performance of his official duties.57 It is sometimes asserted by
the force member's commander that an accused subordinate is im-
mune from the jurisdiction of the host nation under the theory that
he is an agent of the sending State.58 The commander can thereby
assert that any acts done by the accused in the performance of his
duties are immune from the host nation's prosecution. 59 An inter-
national incident may result if the commander has custody of the
accused and refuses to waive the sending State's jurisdiction.
3. Restrictive Theory of Immunity. State immunity is still a
viable concept, although the doctrine's effect has been limited by




52. Id; see also Stanger, supra note 10, at 8.
53. Stanger, supra note 10, at 8.
54. 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (2d ed. rev. 1947); see also Stanger supra, note
10, at 8 n.21.
55. It has been suggested that in determining a jurisdictional question, both claims
should be taken into account. See e.g., Stanger, supra note 10, at 25.
56. Acts done as an agent of a State while in the performance of official duties some-
times enjoy immunity. Acts of Consuls and Ambassadors have such immunity. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id Such an assertion presupposes the absence of a treaty regarding such claims.
59. The Commander can base his claim to jurisdiction on the "law of the flag." See
infra text accompanying notes 73-82.
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statutes and court decisions in many nations. A growing number of
States have adopted the restrictive theory of immunity,60 due to the
growth of commercial activities of foreign governments. 61 As the
acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State wrote in the Tate
Letter, "the Department feels that the widespread and increasing
practice on the part of governments engaging in commercial activi-
ties makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing
business with them to have their rights determined in the courts. 62
The restrictive approach to immunity was officially adopted by
the United States Department of State in 1952,63 and was endorsed
by the American Law Institute in 1965 .64 Under the restrictive the-
ory of immunity, the immunity of a sovereign would only be recog-
nized in regard to sovereign public acts (jure imperit) and not
private acts (lure gestiones).65 However, attempts to distinguish be-
tween public and private acts which trigger immunity have not re-
sulted in any clear-cut definitions of the two terms.66
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197667 was intended
to clarify when a State could claim immunity based on its public
acts. The legislative history of the Act indicates that its intention
was not to provide a foreign State with sovereign immunity when a
lawsuit is based on a commercial transaction or some other private
act of the foreign State.68 However, where a service member is per-
forming an act in the course of his official duties in a foreign State,
his conduct appears to fall under the category of a public act of his
State.69 The United States and most authorities support immunity
for offenses committed in the line of duty by military personnel.70
60. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 301-02
(1981)[hereinafter cited as J. SWEENEY].
61. Id. at 304
62. The Tate Letter notified the Attorney General that The Department of State was
officially adopting the restrictive approach to territorial sovereign immunity. The restrictive
approach only accords immunity to public acts and not to commercial acts. 26 DEP'T. ST.
BULL., 984-85 (1952).
63. See infra note 100 for further amplification of this point.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 69 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
65. See supra note 62.
66. See lsbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200 (2nd Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
67. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (amending Title 28
United States Code); see also J. SWEENEY, supra note 60, at 310.
68. Id
69. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 17.
70. Id. at 18.
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In practice, the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty has
not become the predominant standard in the international commu-
nity.7' Too many States extend their jurisdiction to offenses com-
mitted outside their own boundaries and in the territory of another
State.72 Full or restricted immunity for official State acts in foreign
nations is substantially more commonplace.
B. Law of the Flag
The basis for asserting jurisdiction under the law of the flag
theory is that an armed forces member serving in a foreign nation is
a representative of his sovereign. 73 As such a representative he is
therefore accountable only to the law of the flag under which he
serves.
74
A United States Armed Forces member who disobeys a lawful
order of his superiors commits the same offense regardless of
whether he is in the territory of a foreign nation or in the United
States.75 He can be punished according to the rules of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.). 76 This procedure is ordinarily
of no interest to the receiving State, however, and is not considered
to affect its sovereignty.77
In contrast, when the laws of the host nation are broken by a
member of a visiting force, the situation is far more complex.78 In
these instances there is a real conflict under the law of the flag be-
tween the territorial jurisdiction of the host and the jurisdiction of
the sending flag nation.79 One view holds that the law of the flag
does not grant the host nation jurisdiction to punish in such a cir-
cumstance. 80 Only the commanding officer or home State has au-
71. Stanger, supra note 10, at 8.
72. Id. at 8 n.21.
73. Id. at 25.
74. Beesley, supra note 32, at 185.
75. Id.
76. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802, 805, 818 (Supp. 1981).
77. Beesley, supra note 32, at 185.
78. The debate regarding whether the "law of the flag" limits the jurisdictional powers
of the territorial State has been a continuing one. Since there have been few modem cases on
the subject, any new decisions relevant to the visiting force's status are of import. For this
reason, several cases decided by the United States Court of Military Appeals are examined in
Part III of this Comment.
79. Id.
80. 1 L. OPPENHEIM INTERNATIONAL LAW § 445 (7th ed. Lauterpact 1948). Oppen-
heim, an influential German writer, wrote:
Whenever armed forces are on foreign territory in the service of their home state,
they are considered extraterritorial and remain, therefore, under its jurisdiction. A
Vol. 14
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thority to take such action while the member or the visiting force is
on duty.8' However, if the soldier leaves the confines of the garri-
son for recreational purposes, the host nation has jurisdiction to
punish him for crimes committed while outside the scope of mili-
tary duty.82
A different view holds that necessity and convenience prevent
the host nation's exercise of jurisdiction over a visiting force.
83
Scholars advocating this position84 contend that when a member of
the force commits an offense in the host nation's territory, he can be
prosecuted only by the authorities of the sending nation. 85 The re-
ceiving nation can punish- the -offender only if the sending nation
voluntarily relinquishes jurisdiction.86
The position of the United States on the law of the flag doc-
trine was originally set forth in The Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don.87 The Supreme Court's opinion held that a visiting foreign
warship 88 was not subject to the jurisdiction of United States
crime committed on foreign territory b-y-a member of these forces cannot be pun-
ished by the local civil or military authorities, but only by the commanding officer
of the forces or by other authorities of their home state.
However, note that he added an important qualification:
This rule, however, applies only in case the crime is committed, either within the
place where the force is stationed, or in some place where the criminal was on duty;
it does not apply, if, for example, soldiers belonging to a foreign garrison of a for-
tress leave the rayon of the fortress, not on duty but for recreation and pleasure, and
then and there commit a crime. The local authorities are in that case competent to
punish them...
Id. (emphasis in original).
81. Id.
82. Id. Oppenheim's support for the law of flag was further qualified in the eighth
edition of his treatise. See I L. OPPENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL LAW § 445 (8th ed. Lauterpact
1955).
83. 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 819 (2d ed. rev. 1947).
84. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 11. Lazareff quotes a French writer's statement of the
law of the flag doctrine, who states that:
Strong grounds of convenience and necessity prevent the exercise of jurisdiction
over a foreign organized military force which, with the consent of the territorial
sovereign, enters its domain. Members of the force who there commit offenses are
dealt with by the military or other authorities of the State to whose service they




87. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
88. Id at 116-34. The Exchange, while on a voyage from Baltimore to Spain, had been
seized on the high seas from its American owners by a French man-of-war. It was reassigned
to the French navy as an armed naval vessel. When a storm drove it into Philadelphia for
repairs, the American owners filed a libel in U.S. District Court attempting to regain posses-
sion. The District Court dismissed the libel, and the Circuit Court reversed the dismissal.
9
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Courts.89 In often cited dictum, the Chief Justice spoke of the situ-
ation in which a nation allows troops of a foreign sovereign to pass
through its territory: "the grant of a free passage, therefore, implies
a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage and
permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those
punishments which the government of his army may require."9
The Supreme Court followed the Schooner Exchange doctrine in
several subsequent cases. 91
For law of the flag advocates, this statement in the Schooner
Exchange reiterates the principle that friendly forces on foreign soil
are immune from the jurisdiction of that foreign nation.92 How-
ever, not all courts or writers agree with this interpretation and
would more narrowly construe the Schooner Exchange dictum. 93
Proponents of the NATO SOFA argued during its debate in the
Senate that Chief Justice Marshall's remarks applied only to troops
during their passage, and not to military forces stationed on a semi-
permanent basis in a foreign nation.94
Despite this opposition, American political leaders fought for
the law of the flag principle prior to adoption of the NATO
SOFA.95 Their reasoning was partly based on the concern that
American soldiers might be deprived of their constitutional rights
by trials in foreign courts. Law of the flag proponents argued that
these rights should follow United States troops wherever they go.
9 6
It was further contended that there were strong grounds of conven-
ience and necessity for military commanders to maintain discipline
The Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal of the libel and the American owners did not
regain possession.
89. Id. at 135-36.
90. Id. at 135.
91. E.g., in Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1879), the Court said "It is well settled
that a foreign Army permitted to march through a friendly country, or to be stationed in it,
by permission of its Government or Sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion of the place. ... The Court in Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1901), stated, "If
foreign troops are permitted to enter or cross our territory, they are still subject to the control
of their own officers and escape from local jurisdiction."
92. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 15
93. See generally id at 15-16; see also Beesley, supra note 32, at 189.
94. 99 CONG. REC. 8733-34 (1953). Senator Knowland argued during debate that since
the quasi-permanent stationing of Allied Forces within a foreign nation was unknown at that
time, Chief Justice Marshall's dicta could only have been meant to apply to the transit of
military units. Senator Wiley further cited an Australian Court case interpreting Marshall's
opinion buttressing this position.
95. 99 CONG REC. 8731-82 (1953) (statements of Senators Wiley, Dirksen and McCar-
ran); NATO SOFA, supra note 23, at 1792.
96. 99 CONG. REC. 8743 (1953).
Vol. 14
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss2/5
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
and control over their forces, without which the force could lose its
combat capabilities.97 The law of the flag adherents therefore
thought that all offenses by a visiting force should be dealt with by
the authorities of the sending State, unless the offenders were vol-
untarily turned over to the local authorities.98
This position was generally supported by American writers
and authorities until approximately the end of the occupation after
the Second World War. At that time the strength of the law of the
flag principle in the United States began to wane as the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity began gathering impetus. 99 The de-
mise of the law of the flag was hastened by the United States De-
partment of State's official adoption of the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in 1952."°
As the law of the flag principle lost support, the United States
Court of Military Appeals (C.M.A.) i° ' was given the task of decid-
ing a series of cases affecting jurisdiction over visiting military
forces. The holdings are noteworthy because of the paucity of re-
cent cases on this aspect of international law. These decisions inter-
preted customary international law on the status of forces as
applied to the United States Military and its civilian employees.
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF VISITING AMERICAN FORCES
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Application of the law of the flag principle collided with the
territorial sovereign immunity theory in a series of cases in the
1950's and the 1960's. In those cases the C.M.A. 10 2 decided a
97. Id.
98. Id. Senator Bricker quoted from I HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 247 as follows:
Strong grounds of convenience and necessity prevent the exercise over a foreign
organized military force which with the consent of the territorial sovereign enters its
domain. Members of the force who there commit offenses are dealt with by the
military or other authorities of the State to whose service they belong, unless the
offenders are voluntarily given up.
99. J. SWEENEY, supra note 60, at 301-04.
100. 26 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 984-985 (1952). Letter from the Acting Legal Advisor of the
Dept. of State to the Dept. of Justice, May 19, 1952. In the letter, Jack B. Tate reviewed the
trend among other nations toward use of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as
opposed to the classical or absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity. He stated that
thereafter the State Department would follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
Under this theory only sovereign or public acts of a State would be given immunity. Private
acts would not be immune. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
101. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 311. The Court of Military Appeals was created in 1950
by Congress as a "supreme" court for the military justice system. The court consists of three
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number of key issues regarding visiting United States forces under
principles of customary international law.
A. Cases Illustrating the Current Status of Visiting United States
Forces
In United States v. Weiman,t °3 the C.M.A. decided the issue of
whether United States military jurisdiction could be exercised in
the territory of another State."° The Court held that the weight of
international law supported a nation's right to exercise authority
over its military forces while located in a foreign nation. °5 The
Court based its decision on its previous holdings in The Schooner
Exchange10 6 and Coleman v. Tennessee.'°7 In those cases the Court
held that international law did not prevent the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the accused soldier's nation. 0 8 Weiman was subsequently
upheld in United States v. Robertson.1°9 The Robertson court held
that a United States military court was permitted to exercise juris-
diction over its visiting forces within the territory of another
State. I 10
In United States v. Sinigar,"' the Court was presented with the
issue of whether visiting forces are immune from local jurisdiction.
The Court first held that Canada and the United States had concur-
rent jurisdiction over the accused." 12 Reasoning that Canada's ju-
risdiction derived from the territorial principle, the Court stated
that the United States also had jurisdiction based on its personal
supremacy under the law of the flag. 1 3 However, the Court de-
cided that the Canadian authorities were competent to punish the
accused, who had left his base in Canada and committed an offense
while off duty." 4 The Court's reasoning was grounded on what it
103. 3 C.M.A. 216,11 C.M.R. 216 (1953). In this case, the accused were Polish nationals
and quasi-military members of the U.S. Army in France.
104. 3 C.M.A. 218, 11 C.M.R. 218.
105. 3 C.M.A. 219, 11 C.M.R. 219.
106. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), as cited in Weiman, supra note 102, at 219.
107. 97 U.S. 509 (1879), as citedin Weiman, supra note 102, at 219.
108. 3 C.M.A. 219, 11 C.M.R. 219.
109. 5 C.M.A. 806, 19 C.M.R. 102 (1955). Robertson was a merchant-seaman on a Mili-
tary Sea Transport Service ship which carried cargo to the U.S. armed forces in Japan. The
Court held he was subject to military jurisdiction as a person accompanying the armed
forces. He was tried and convicted for a homicide which occured in Japan.
I10. Id
111. 6 C.M.A. 330, 20 C.M.R. 46 (1955).
112. 6 C.M.A. 331, 20 C.M.R. 47.
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considered to be a general rule that the law of the flag did not apply
when a soldier serving in a foreign nation left his camp or post for
recreation and later committed an offense. "5 In that case, there-
fore, the local authorities were competent to punish the soldier. "6
The Court eventually dismissed the charges against Sinigar be-
cause of insufficient evidence." 7 However, it is significant that the
Court took pains in its lengthy dicta to lay down for future use the
rule that visiting forces are not immune from local jurisdiction for
offenses committed against the host nation while off duty." 18
In the final decision in this series of cases, the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals again took up the issue of concurrent jurisdiction. In
United States v. Cadenhead"9 the Court held that American armed
forces personnel stationed in Japan on a permanent basis could be
tried and punished by Japan for offenses committed within its terri-
tory. 20 This full recognition of the host nation's criminal j urisdic-
tion over foreign military forces refuted any blanket claim of
immunity for United States forces. As authority for its position, the
Court relied on Girard v. Wilson, '2 in which the United States
Supreme Court had earlier recognized the exercise of foreign juris-
diction over American forces abroad under certain conditions.
Generally, since Cadenhead and Wilson, American authorities
and courts no longer advocate the position that members of visiting
armed forces are absolutely immune from local jurisdiction. How-
ever, at least one authority has expressed reservations regarding
this view when internal discipline of the force is involved.'22
115. Id. The Court cited I L. OPPENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL LAW § 445 (7th ed.
Lauterpact 1948) as authority. See supra note 80 for the full text of the rule.
116. 6 C.M.A. 330, 337, 20 C.M.R. 46, 52 (1955).
117. 6 C.M.A. 338, 20 C.M.R. 54.
118. 6 C.M.A. 337, 20 C.M.R. 53.
119. 14 C.M.A. 271, 34 C.M.R. 51 (1963). Cadenhead, a minor, was a member of the
U.S. Air Force stationed in Japan. He was accused of robbing a Japanese taxi driver. The
Japanese asked for and received jurisdiction but released Cadenhead after a Japanese Fam-
ily Court Judge held that it would be impossible to apply the "educative" policy of Japanese
family law. Cadenhead was subsequently tried and convicted by a U.S. court-martial.
120. 14 C.M.A. 272-73, 34 C.M.R. 52-53.
121. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
122. RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 59, Comment a, which states:
Extent of waiver in general. As stated in § 56, unless otherwise expressly indicated,
military courts of a foreign force are entitled to exercise their jurisdiction in matters
of discipline. This exercise of jurisdiction may include trial of a member of the
force for an act that also violates the local criminal law. As indicated in § 57, this
fight to exercise jurisdiction is not exclusive, and courts of the territorial state retain
the right to try a member of a force for offenses against its criminal law.
13
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B. Summary of the United States' Position Regarding the Status
of Forces
The aforementioned cases indicate that the present position of
the United States on the status of visiting forces under customary
international law can be stated as: (1) military courts of visiting
forces are permitted to exercise jurisdiction over force members
while in the territory of the host State, and (2) host nation authori-
ties may also exercise jurisdiction over members of the visiting
force for off-duty offenses committed outside the post. 123 This posi-
tion is logical when considered in light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Girard v. Wilson,124 and the impact of the Department of
State's position set forth by the Tate letter.'
25
To summarize, restricted territorial sovereignty has prevailed
over the doctrines of the law of the flag and absolute territorial sov-
ereignty. Concurrent jurisdiction exists under customary interna-
tional law when an off-duty member of a visiting force performs a
criminal act which simultaneously breaks the laws of the host State
and the sending nation. 126 As previously indicated, international
law does not offer a solution to the question of which nation may
first exercise jurisdiction over such an accused.
127
At the end of the Second World War, many allies of the
United States indicated that the circumstances regarding United
States forces stationed in their territory would change drastically. 1
28
These nations emphasized that their grant of exclusive jurisdiction
to the United States over its forces was brought about as a result of
the exigencies of war.129 The Allies viewed this concession as at an
end with the termination of hostilities. 30 Consequently, it became
imperative to find a solution to the concurrent jurisdiction dilemma
caused by the gap in international law. The answer was found in
the use of formal international agreements.
123. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 336.
124. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). In Girard, the Court recognized foreign
jurisdiction over an American soldier under criminal indictment for breaking the laws of the
receiving State when the U.S. agreed to waive jurisdiction.
125. See supra notes 62 and 100 and accompanying text.
126. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 336.
127. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 9.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCERNING JURISDICTION
OVER VISITING FORCES
The United States and many of its allies maintained a substan-
tial number of forces abroad after World War II. It became a com-
mon practice for these nations to utilize formal agreements to
define the legal status of the visiting forces.' 3 ' The United States
alone, for example, has entered into more than 50 bilateral agree-
ments with other nations regarding the legal status of its forces.'
32
One agreement in particular, the NATO SOFA, 133 has had a great
impact regarding the status of forces.
A. The NATO SOFA
The genesis of the NATO SOFA provisions was the multilat-
eral agreement between members of the Brussels Pact, of which the
United States was not a member.' 34 The Brussels Pact, which was
joined by a majority of the future NATO countries, provided that
any criminal acts committed by visiting forces within the host na-
tion's territory were within that nation's jurisdiction. 35 In the
event of a request from the sending nation for a waiver of jurisdic-
tion, the host nation was only obliged to give sympathetic consider-
ation to the request.' 36 The criminal jurisdiction arrangements of
the Pact became the basis for article VII of the NATO SOFA on
the same subject. 
13
The main objecitves in devising the NATO SOFA were as fol-
lows. First, the signatories wanted to ensure that the presence of
the visiting friendly forces in the host nation would be accompa-
nied by all possible good will on the part of the nations con-
cerned. 138 Second, they wanted to enhance the mobility of NATO
forces by uniformly minimizing national border restrictions. 139 Fi-
nally and most importantly, the NATO powers wanted to resolve
131. Stanger, supra note 10, at 148.
132. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 1. As of 1982 there were 165 independent nations in
the world. This indicates that there are more than one hundred nations with which the
United States has no such pacts. I U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD YEAR-
BOOK 139 (1982).
133. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 3, 128.
134. Id. at 64. Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were
the members of the Brussels Pact.
135. Stanger, supra note 10, at 145.
136. Id. at 145 n.ll.
137. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 64.
138. 99 CONG. REC. 8731 (1953) (statement of Senator Wiley).
139. 1d.
15
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the question of priority in situations where concurrent criminal ju-
risdiction existed. '40 It should also be noted that according to some
American political leaders, an additional purpose of the NATO
SOFA was to safeguard the constitutional rights of United States
forces when a foreign nation had jurisdiction to try them for crimi-
nal offenses. '
B. History of the NATO SOFA
The NATO SOFA was signed in London on June 19, 1951.
The Senate's advice and consent was given on July 15, 1953, and
the pact was ratified by the President on July 24, 1953.142 While the
Agreement contained twenty articles, the preponderance of the crit-
icism during the debate over ratification was directed at Article
VII, 43 the provision on criminal jurisdiction.'"
Detractors of the proposed Agreement argued that the United
States gave up more rights than was required under customary in-
ternational law. 145 As a result of both these objections and consid-
erable public pressure, the Senate attached a reservation 46 to the
NATO SOFA. The reservation was intended to clarify the position
of the United States concerning criminal jurisdiction. The reserva-
tion directs a commanding officer to request the receiving State to
waive jurisdiction if, in his opinion, the accused's constitutional
rights might be endangered by a trial in the receiving State. 47  If
such a request is denied, the commanding officer is to ask the De-
partment of State to press for a waiver through diplomatic chan-
nels. 148 In addition, a United States representative is to attend such
140. Id.
141. Id. at 8732 (statement of Senator McCarran).
142. NATO SOFA supra note 23, at 1792. The Senate vote was 72 to 12. 99 CONG. REC.
9088 (1953).
143. 99 CONG REC. 8731-82 (1953); NATO SOFA supra note 23, at 1792. The other 19
Articles include: I. Definitions; II. Duty to obey laws of the host nation; 1II. Travel docu-
ment requirements; IV. Driver licensing; V. Uniform apparel regulations; VI. Carrying of
firearms; VIII. Damage claims; IX. Supplies, facilities and services; X. Local tax exemp-
tion; XI. Import duties; XII. Customs exemptions; XIII. Sending state assistance to customs;
XIV. Foreign exchange procedures; XV. Application of the Agreement in the event of hos-
tilities; XVI. Procedures for interpretation of the Agreement; XVII. Provisions for revision
of the Agreement; XVIII. Ratification of the Agreement; XIX. Denunciation procedures;
XX. Territorial coverage of the Agreement.
144. NATO SOFA, supra note 23, at 1798, art. VII.
145. 99 CONG. REC. 8732-33 (1953). The detractors believed that visiting forces were
immune from local criminal jurisdiction under customary international law.
146. NATO SOFA, supra note 23, at 1828.
147. Id.
148. Id Additionally, in the event of a denial, the Executive Branch was to notify the
Vol. 14
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trials and report whenever a violation of the due process provisions
of Article VII are perceived. 149 Following this report, the senior
commander can then request further diplomatic assistance.
The challenge to Article VII of the NATO SOFA was renewed
in 1955 by its detractors in the Senate and House. House Joint Res-
olution (HJR) 309 was introduced in May 1955.150 Its purpose was
to seek revision of the SOFA so that host countries could not con-
tinue to exert criminal jurisdiction over American armed forces
personnel.'' However, the resolution failed to pass.
5 2
Prior to the adoption of the NATO SOFA, there was consider-
able disagreement and confusion regarding the immunity from
criminal jurisdiction of members of the visiting force for offenses
committed in the host nation's territory.153 There were those in the
United States who advocated the position that the United States
retained absolute jurisdiction over its deployed forces. 5 4 This atti-
tude reflected a desire to adhere to the wartime rules which for-
merly prevailed. '5 5 With the advent of peace, however, many allies
were no longer willing to allow the United States to retain exclusive
jurisdiction over its forces abroad. 156 Another solution had to be
found, and the provisions of Article VII were the result.
C Summary of the Criminal Jurisdiction Provisions of the NA TO
SOFA
During the Second World War, the dominant consideration
regarding jurisdiction over allied foreign forces was the necessity to
Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives. Furthermore, a
representative of the U.S. was to be appointed to attend such trials and report any denial of
due process under Article VII, paragraph 9 to the senior commander of the U.S. Forces in
the receiving State.
149. Id.
150. H.J.R. 309, 84th Cong., 1st. Sess., 101 CONG. REC. 6581 (1955).
151. Id
152. 101 CONG. REC. 12679 (1955). A serious Congressional challenge to the adequacy
of the NATO SOFA criminal jurisdiction provisions has not arisen since. Congress appears
satisfied with the operation of Article VII. See generally 102 CONG. REC. 9899-9906 (1956).
153. Stanger, supra note 10, at 143 n.10.
154. 99 CONG. REC. 8731-32 (1953).
155. According to Stanger, supra note 10, at 140, "The United States had exclusive juris-
diction over its forces in most, though not all, foreign countries in World War II.
156. Stanger, supra note 19, at 84-85; see also Stanger, supra note 10, at 146-47. This
unwillingness is due to a number of factors such as less urgency for the presence of troops in
peacetime, less danger and hardship being endured by the troops in peacetime, and an in-
crease in nationalism in recent years.
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avoid interference with the force's combat operations. 57  This re-
sulted in the sending State's desire to retain exclusive jurisdiction.
The need to address this problem during peacetime conditions re-
sulted in the solution provided for in Article VII of the NATO
SOFA.
158
Article VII is the key article of the NATO SOFA and is the
most controversial of the twenty articles in the agreement.' 59 It de-
lineates the allocation of criminal jurisdiction and the cooperation
expected between signatories in criminal matters. Its key compo-
nents are summarized below.
1. Paragraph one. This paragraph sets forth the basic guide-
lines for exercising concurrent jurisdiction.160  It notes that the re-
ceiving and sending States often have concurrent jurisdiction over
members of the visiting force. 16  Subsection (a) of paragraph one
recognizes the right of the sending State to exercise a degree of au-
thority in an extraterritorial manner. Conversely, an objective of
subsection (b) is to make it clear that the host nation retains very
broad jurisdictional powers, due to the fact that it is the territorial
sovereign State.
2. Paragraph two. There are two situations under which Arti-
cle VII grants exclusive jurisdiction. 62 Paragraph two sets forth
these exceptions. 63  First, if the act is a security related offense
punishable only by the military law of the sending nation and not
the law of the receiving State, the sending State has exclusive juris-
157. Stanger, supra note 10, at 88.
158. 99 CONG. REC. 8729 (1953) (statement of Senator Wiley).
159. Beesley, supra note 32, at 202; S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 128.
160. Paragraph I of Article VII of the NATO SOFA provides:
1. Subject to the provisions of this Article,
(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise
within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on
them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of
that State;
(b) the authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the mem-
bers of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences
committed within the territory of the receiving State and punishable by the law of
that State.
NATO SOFA, supra note 23, at 1798.
161. Beesley, supra note 32, at 204.
162. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 151-52.
163. Paragraph 2 of Article VII of the NATO SOFA provides:
2. (a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with
respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law
of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving State.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclu-
sive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and their depen-
Vol. 14
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diction. Second, the receiving State has exclusive jurisdiction over
visiting force members when the offense is related to the security of
the host nation and is punishable only by the host nation's law and
not by the law of the sending State."6 Generally, there is a right to
exercise concurrent jurisdiction in all other cases.' 6 5
3. Paragraph three. This part of Article VII 66 is designed to
fill the gap in international law regarding the issue of which nation
has priority to exercise jurisdiction when concurrent jurisdiction is
present.167 This provision sets forth a system of priorities as to the
right to exercise jurisdiction.
1 61
The category of the offense determines which State has the pri-
mary right to exercise jurisdiction. There are two types of offenses
which give the military authorities of the sending State the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction. The first is an offense solely against
the person, property or security of the sending State.169 The second
type of offense is one "arising out of any act or omission done in the
performance of official duty."' 70 The receiving State has the pri-
dents with respect to offences, including offences relating to the security of that
State, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending State.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a
security offence against a State shall include:
(i) treason against the State;
(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of
that State, or secrets relating to the national defence of that State.
Id.
164. Id, sub paragraph (b).
165. Beesley, supra note 32, at 205.
166. Paragraph 3 of Article VII of the NATO SOFA provides:
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules
shall apply:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in relation
to
(i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences
solely against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian
component of that State or of a dependent;
(ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of
official duty.
(b) In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving State shall
have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it
shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities
of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a re-
quest from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where
that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.
NATO SOFA, supra note 23, at 1800.
167. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 160.
168. Id. at 161.
169. See supra note 166.
170. Id.
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mary right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses.' 7 '
Article VII also contains an important provision on waiver
procedures. 7 2 The State with primary jurisdiction is called upon to
give sympathetic consideration to a request from the other nation
for a waiver of the former's right. Some writers believe this concept
is so broadly accepted that it has become a part of customary inter-
national law. 1
7 3
4. Paragraphfour. The main purpose of this paragraph is to
resolve the problems of dual nationality. 7 4 This provision allows
the sending State to exercise jurisdiction over a national of the re-
ceiving State if the national is a member of the sending State's
forces.
5. Paragraph five. The duty of the sending and receiving
States to assist one another in arresting accused members of a force
in the receiving State's territory is covered in this part of Article
VII. "' This paragraph also concerns extraterritoriality by rejecting
any right of asylum and making it clear that the military installa-
tions of the sending State enjoy no extraterritorial privileges.
17 6
The United States has a long history of cooperation under this
article. '77
6. Paragraph nine. The final section of Article VII contains
the due process safeguards accorded the accused when he is prose-
cuted by a receiving State. 178 Senator Wiley introduced the inclu-
sion of these safeguards while debating before the Senate on the
171. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, a 161.
172. See supra note 166, subsection 3.
173. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 336.
174. NATO SOFA, supra note 23, art. VII (4).
175. Paragraph 5 of Article VII of the NATO SOFA provides:
5. (a) The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each other in
the arrest of members of a force or civilian component or their dependents in the
territory of the receiving State and in handing them over to the authority which is
to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall notify promptly the military
authorities of the sending State of the arrest of any member of a force or civilian
component or a dependent.
(c) The custody of an accused member of a force or civilian component over
whom the receiving State is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the
sending State, remain with that State until he is charged by the receiving State.
NATO SOFA, supra note 23, at 1800.
176. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 238.
177. Beesley, supra note 32, at 206-07.
178. Paragraph 9 of Article VII, of the NATO SOFA provides:
Vol. 14
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NATO SOFA.'7 9 The Senator offered them as assurances designed
to overcome doubts about whether American servicemen would re-
ceive a fair trial in the courts of other NATO countries. 180
D. Problems Encountered in Interpreting Status of Forces
Agreements
Article VII grants exclusive jurisdiction to the sending State
for offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the perform-
ance of official duty.' 8 ' Attempted application of this provision im-
mediately raises two important questions: (1) which authority will
make the determination of whether the offense was in the perform-
ance of official duty, and (2) what is the actual meaning of the term
"performance of official duty." The original NATO Agreement is
silent regarding both issues. 182
The Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement with Respect to Forces Stationed in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany 83 clarified which State shall have the power to de-
cide the question as to what constitutes "performance of official
duty." The Agreement states that the duty determination is to be
made in accordance with the law of the sending State. 18 4 It further
provides that the highest appropriate authority of the sending State
9. Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prose-
cuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled-
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made
against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they
are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defence or to have
free or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time
being in the receiving State;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter;
and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending
State and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present
at his trial.
NATO SOFA, supra note 23, at 1802.
179. 99 CONG. REC. 8730 (1953).
180. Id.
181. NATO SOFA, supra note 23, at 1800, art. VII, 3(a)(ii).
182. Stanger, supra note 10, at 235-38; S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 176.
183. Aug. 3, 1959, 14 U.S.T. 531, T.I.A.S. No. 5351, 481 U.N.T.S. 262. The Supplemen-
tary Agreement was entered into force on July 1, 1963. The signatories were the United
States, United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany.
184. Article 18 of the NATO Supplementary Agreement provides:
1. Whenever, in the course of criminal proceedings against a member of a force or
of a civilian component, it becomes necessary to determine whether an offence has
arisen out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty, such
determination shall be made in accordance with the law of the sending State con-
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may submit a certificate of its determination to the court hearing
the case. 85 Generally, the court is to make its decision in conform-
ity with the certificate.1 86 However, in exceptional cases the Agree-
ment also provides for review of the certificate by the receiving
State's government, as well as by the diplomatic mission of the
sending nation. 87 The result is that once the sending State has de-
cided that an offense has been committed in the performance of
official duty, the case is outside the jurisdiction of the receiving
State. 188
The difficulty this Agreement presents is that not all of the
SOFAs entered into by the United States contain a provision simi-
lar to Article 18 of the West German SOFA. Only the Japanese,
Federation of the West Indies, Phillippine, and West German
Agreements contain a clause specifically addressing the problem.' 9
In practice, the courts of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and
Turkey have generally accepted the military authority's determina-
tion as to whether the offense was committed in the performance of
duty. '9 Thus there is no general rule regarding this sensitive is-
sue.' 9 ' Consequently the ability to secure a uniform solution to the
official duty determination is missing.' 92
A striking example of a difference of opinion between the
sending and receiving States on the meaning of "performance of
duty" occured in Wilson v. Girard.93  Girard, serving with the
United States Army in Japan, caused the death of a Japanese wo-
man.'94 The Administrative Agreement' 95 covering the status of
cerned. The highest appropriate authority of such sending State may submit to the
German court or authority dealing with the case a certificate thereon.
2. The German court or authority shall make its decision in conformity with the
certificate. In exceptional cases, however, such certificate may, at the request of the
German court or authority, be made the subject of review through discussions be-
tween the Federal Government and the diplomatic mission in the Federal Republic
of the sending State.
Id at 552.
185. Id.
186. NATO SOFA, supra note 23, at 552, art. XVIII(2).
187. Id.
188. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 171.
189. See generally Stanger, supra note 10, at 235-38.
190. Id.
191. Id at 238.
192. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 176-77
193. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
194. During maneuvers, Girard had been ordered to guard a machine gun on top of a
hill. The victim, along with other Japanese civilians, entered a posted, prohibited area to
recover expended brass cartridge cases. Girard was accused of throwing out empty shell
cases to entice the Japanese to approach. He denied the allegation. The woman was killed
Vol. 14
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forces between Japan and the United States had been amended by
protocol which incorporated the NATO SOFA provisions regard-
ing concurrent jurisdiction. 96 The Agreement granted the United
States military authorities primary jurisdiction for "offenses arising
out of any act or omission done in the performance of official
duty."' 97 The Agreement also provided for a Joint Committee to
resolve any disputed matters between the United States and
Japan. 1
9 8
The United States authorities insisted on the right to try
Girard on grounds that he had acted in the furtherance of an offi-
cial duty. The claim was certified by Girard's commanding officer,
and consequently the United States claimed primary jurisdiction.
Conversly, Japan insisted that it had proof that Girard's act was not
within the purview of his official duties, and as such the Japanese
had the primary right to try him. 199
The Joint Committee was unable to resolve the dispute and the
matter was referred to the highest levels of government. Finally,
after extended negotiations, the United States government author-
ized its Joint Committee representatives to waive whatever jurisdic-
tion it claimed in the case.2" This act preserved the United States'
position that Girard had committed the act in the official perform-
ance of duty. Relying on the Executive Branch's position, the
Supreme Court affirmed a District Court's denial of a writ of
habeas corpus for Girard 0 1 He was subsequently tried and con-
victed by a Japanese court.2 °2
E. Concurrent Jurisdiction and the Operation of Article VII
Statistics concerning criminal offenses committed by United
States armed forces personnel stationed overseas are kept by the
Department of Defense. The statistics pertain only to United
when Girard fired an empty shell from his rifle grenade launcher and it struck her in the
back. Girard testified that he had only intended to frighten the woman. Id.
195. Administrative Agreement Under Article III Of The Security Treaty Between The
United States of American and Japan, February 28, 1952, 3 U.S.T. 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492.
196. Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement Under Article III
of the Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, September 29, 1953,
4 U.S.T. 1846, T.I.A.S. No. 2848.
197. Id. 4 U.S.T. 1846, 1848.
198. 3 U.S.T. 3341, 3361.
199. 354 U.S. 538-39.
200. Stanger, supra note 10, at 229 n.34.
201. 354 U.S. 530.
202. Japan v. Girard, 26 I.L.R. 203 (Japan, District Court of Maebashi 1957).
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States forces. Although other NATO nations do not promulgate a
similar analysis for offenses committed by members of their armed
forces,2 °3 these data nevertheless make possible a useful compari-
son of the operation of Article VII in NATO countries with coun-




The latest report available covers the period from December 1,
1980 to November 30, 1981.205 This report reveals that United
States military forces stationed world-wide were involved in 64,101
offenses subject to primary or exclusive jurisdiction of foreign
tribunals.20 6 Of these cases, 38,237 involved traffic offenses includ-
ing drunken and reckless driving and fleeing the scene of an acci-
dent. 217 The report indicates that 24,955 of the cases world-wide
involved concurrent jurisdiction. Of these cases, a waiver of local
jurisdiction was obtained by the United States in 21,521 (86.1%) of
the cases where the host nation had primary jurisdiction,20 8
Of the American military personnel tried world-wide, 382
(.9%) were acquitted, 171 (.4%) were sentenced to confinement, 251
(.6%) received suspended sentences to confinement, and 43,187
(98.2%) were fined or reprimanded. Of those sentenced to confine-
ment for serious crimes, three received life sentences, the most se-
vere sanctions meted out by the foreign courts during this reporting
period.20 9
The statistics in this report offer support for the procedures
used under Article VII. The local jurisdiction waiver rate for of-
fenses committed by United States military personnel in NATO
countries was 96.5% for the reported period. 210 This compares with
the 86.1% world-wide rate. The percentage of waivers successfully
obtained for United States forces in NATO countries is probably
far higher than the drafters of the Agreement ever envisioned.
It is clear that Article VII has had a significant impact on the
lives of United States armed forces members. As a result of the
NATO Agreement provisions on criminal jurisdiction, many
203. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 256-61.
204. DOD STATISTICS, supra note 14, at 1-10.
205. Id at 1.
206. Id.
207. Id at 2.
208. Id. at 1. Of those cases tried and completed, only 373 were for serious crimes. The
report defines serious crimes as murder, rape, manslaughter, arson, larceny and related of-
fenses, burglary and related offenses, forgery and related offenses, and aggravated assault.
209. Id. at 1, 3.
210. 1d. at 10. It is to be noted that 57,213 of the 64,101 total criminal offenses worldwide
involved U.S. forces assigned to NATO countries.
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American Armed Forces members have been released for discipli-
nary action under their own system of justice and have not been
tried in foreign courts. With a world-wide acquittal rate of less
than one percent,211 trial under the United States' system of justice
is a major consideration for American servicemen and women.212
F Summary of the NA TO SOFA s Effectiveness
The NATO SOFA attempts to resolve the considerable
problems surrounding status of forces jurisdiction. A reading of
Article V1 213 and the Supplementary Agreement for West Ger-
many214 indicates the complexity of individual criminal jurisdiction
questions generated by the sheer number of forces involved.21 5 In
addition, the Agreement has had to function within the vagaries of
a fluctuating political environment within the NATO alliance and
the world.
Even with its shortcomings, however, there is a general feeling
that the NATO SOFA "has, to a remarkable degree, attained its
objectives. 216 This is borne out by the fact that the agreement is
still in effect after passing the 30th anniversary of its signing.217
NATO forces operate daily under its provisions as they have for
nearly thirty years. Many of the original arguments voiced in the
United States against the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the
NATO SOFA are no longer heard.2 18
The general success of the NATO SOFA, and specifically its
effectiveness in resolving concurrent jurisdiction problems suggests
that such a vehicle can be useful outside the sphere of its signato-
ries. A need for a universally acceptable basis for solving concur-
rent jurisdictional issues has long existed. The NATO SOFA can
211. Id at 1.
212. An explanation for the low acquittal rate might be that the host nation only prose-
cutes those cases in which it has a high probability of success.
213. NATO SOFA supra note 23, at 1798-1802.
214. See supra notes 183-184; see also S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 3, 261.
215. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
375 (100th ed. 1979). In 1978, 494,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed abroad or
deployed on ships. Of that total, 330,000 were serving in Europe, with 234,000 stationed in
Germany.
216. Id. at 261.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 142-157.
218. Even Senator Bricker, who was vehemently opposed to U.S. relinquishment of ex-
clusive jurisdiction, admitted that the NATO SOFA worked without any injustice to U.S.
personnel. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 261. For Senator Bricker's original position see 99
CONG. REC. 4659 (1953).
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provide a useful model for an acceptable codification of interna-
tional law regarding visiting military forces.
V. CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OVER VISITING MILITARY
FORCES
The need for codification of international law into a conven-
tion on the subject of status of forces is evident in several respects.
First, there is the gap in international law regarding which nation
should prevail when the sending and receiving States each have a
different, but valid basis of jurisdiction.2 19 This occurs when a vis-
iting force member commits a criminal offense in the territory of
the receiving nation and the offense also violates the laws of the
sending State.220 In such an event, territorial and law of the flag
jurisdiction are both applicable. 22' However, there are no general
international rules of law for deciding which jurisdictional basis
should prevail.222 In this situation, the two States may choose to
negotiate a solution on a case by case basis. In the alternative, the
State which has custody of the accused may elect to try him first,
regardless of claims of jurisdiction by the other State.223 The prior-
ity procedure for determining jurisdiction adopted by the NATO
SOFA provides a system to end such a dilemma.224
Secondly, significant numbers of military forces have been sta-
tioned on foreign soil since the end of the Second World War.225
The presence of large numbers of visiting forces in receiving na-
tions causes continuing economic, political and legal effects which
must be addressed.226 Without such attention, the relationship be-
tween the sending and receiving States can be placed under a great
deal of stress if a serious incident involving an armed forces mem-
ber occurs.227
Finally, international discord is particularly likely to occur
219. Stanger, supra note 10, at 155.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
221. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 9.
222. According to the RESTATEMENT, "If a state has a basis of jurisdiction that is recog-
nized under international law, it may generally exercise its jurisdiction even though another
state may also have a recognized basis of jurisdiction." RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 37,
comment a.
223. 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 957 (1965).
224. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 161.
225. Id at 1.
226. Id.
227. Stanger, supra note 10, at xi.
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when misunderstandings and tensions develop over criminal of-
fenses involving members of visiting military forces.228 Criminal
jurisdiction involves the basic, primary interest of the State in
maintaining public order and safety.2 9 The State's interests are
balanced against the rights of the individual, but these rights and
interests have varying weights of importance in different socie-
ties. 230 The potential for international friction when more than one
nation has a vital interest in prosecuting a criminal offense can be
magnified in the absence of an agreement. In such a case interna-
tional law does not provide any procedures or absolute rules of pri-
ority when there is concurrent jurisdiction over a criminal
offense. 231 These factors are all important considerations in sup-
port of the need for codification of international law into a conven-
tion regarding concurrent jurisdiction over visiting forces.
A. Recommendation
This Comment recommends that the NATO SOFA be up-
dated and utilized as a basis for codifying internatioanal law into a
convention regarding status of forces. To date, the NATO SOFA
has worked remarkably well in actual practice.232 With moderniza-
tion based upon nearly 30 years of experience, such a convention
should be eminently satisfactory for world-wide usage. It would
not be the first international agreement codified into a convention,
nor the first which has served as the basis for a universally accepta-
ble set of rules.233
A number of NATO-like agreements have been made by
Western nations either among themselves or with States outside the
hemisphere. For example, Japan demanded that the status of
United States forces in that country should be the same as those in
NATO nations. This demand caused an end to exclusive United
States jurisdiction there in 1953.234 The Warsaw Pact nations have
228. Id; see also Chiu, Status of Forces Agreement With the Republic of China. Some
Criminal Case Studies, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 67, 77 (1979). Chiu cites the case of the
acquittal of a U.S. Master Sergeant by a Court-Martial on a charge of manslaughter of a
Chinese National in Taiwan. The acquittal caused such repercussions in the local populace
that an angry mob of Chinese sacked the U.S. Embassy in Taipei.
229. Stanger, supra note 10, at 102.
230. Id
231. Id at 155.
232. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 4, at 261-62.
233. See Baxter, Foreword to S. LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES at i (1971); see
also J. SWEENEY, supra note 60, at 953.
234. Stanger, supra note 10, at 145.
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also adopted jurisdictional provisions similar to those of the NATO
SOFA.235 According to one authority, this is "the surest indication
of its inherent fairness and plausibility." '236 With such a successful
SOFA already in existence, it is only logical to consider it as a
model for a codification of international law.
B. Codification Procedures
The codification proposal could be brought up in the General
Assembly of the United Nations under Article 13 of the United
Nations Charter. That Article allows the General Assembly to ini-
tiate studies and make recommendations for the purposes of fur-
thering the development and codification of international law.
Moreover, under the principles set forth in the Declaration of Uni-
versal Participation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties,231 such a convention dealing with codification of international
law could be opened to accession by invitation to sovereign
States.238 Such codification in the form of a convention could be of
interest and use to any nation, whether or not a member of the
United Nations. A long-term deployment of a visiting force on for-
eign soil could thereby be made subject to the convention's terms,
provided both nations are signatories.239
C. Benefits of Codification Into a United Nations Convention
The potential benefits of a codification of international law
concerning status of forces jurisdiction are manifold. Codification
would bridge a troublesome gap in international law by providing a
predetermined method of ascertaining, according to priorities, the
status of a visiting force serving within the territory of another
State.
A convention on status of forces would also provide more cer-
tainty and uniformity in international relations. It would establish
a preexisting standardized status of forces agreement for implemen-
tation as required. The convention could also help smaller, less
powerful nations achieve more favorable jurisdictional terms that
235. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 199 (1968); Baxter, supra note 233, at i.
236. Baxter, supra note 233, at i, ii.
237. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties Off. Rec., First and Second Sessions 26
Mar. -25 May, 1968 and 9 April-22 May, 1969, Documents of the Conference (U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/26), at 285, as reported in J. SWEENEY, supra note 60, Documentary Supplement
at 222.
238. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 532 (8th ed. Lauterpact 1955).
239. Id. § 512.
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are now unavailable to them in the absence of such a convention.
At present, less powerful nations are often at a disadvantage in sta-
tus of forces negotiations because of their weaker bargaining posi-
tion. A convention setting forth standardized SOFA terms could
strengthen the weaker nation's position.
Codification would also be helpful in the case of short-notice
deployments of military forces for peace-keeping purposes. Addi-
tionally, the convention would be suitable for long-term visiting
force arrangements such as those existing in the Warsaw Pact Na-
tions and Japan. The assignment of Italian, French, and American
forces to Beruit, Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 is illustrative of a situ-
ation in which the proposed convention would have been useful.2 40
The Convention could have been approved by the nations involved
within a short period of time. The jurisdictional status of the forces
involved would then have been readily ascertainable had the need
arisen.
Once it was generally accepted, a secondary benefit of a status
of forces convention would be its power to reduce the chances of a
serious misunderstanding 24' regarding visiting forces. With a set of
known rules for determining which State has primary jurisdiction,
the chances of a disagreement regarding primary jurisdiction would
be greatly reduced.242 International harmony and peace would
thus be enhanced.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under customary international law, the reconciliation of two
applicable but diametrically opposed princples of jurisdiction over
visiting foreign military forces can be a source of international fric-
tion.243 The first principle relates to the territorial sovereignty of
the host nation.2" It calls for exclusive jurisdiction over all acts
within the host nation's territory245 to furher the maintenance of
public safety and welfare.246 In contradiction to the territorial prin-
ciple is the law of the flag.247 Under this concept, the commanders
240. See generally N.Y. Times Aug. 21, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Sept. 29, 1982, § I at 7, col.
7.
241. Stanger, supra note 10, at xi.
242. Baxter, supra note 233, at ii.
243. Stanger, supra note 10, at xi.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 45-54.
245. Id.
246. See supra text accompanying note 12.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 73-100.
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of the visiting force must have exclusive authority to apply military
discipline to members of its own force.248 Without it the com-
mander is no longer in full control of the force and his effectiveness
is thereby derogated.
2 49
In the absence of an agreement, it is difficult to strike a balance
between these two extremes since no one theory of jurisdiction has
prevailed.25 ° Concurrent jurisdiction appears to be the equilibrium
point for criminal offenses. It represents the position of most States
regarding status of forces.2 51 However, when concurrent jurisdic-
tion exists, the problem arises as to which State has priority for the
exercise of jurisdiction.252 The solution utilized in the NATO
SOFA is the highly useful concept of "primary" and "secondary"
jurisdiction.25 3 This priority system of dealing with concurrent
criminal jurisdiction has been in continuous, successful operation
for nearly 30 years.254 The key to the success of the NATO SOFA
lies in Article VII,2 55 which grants the sending State primary juris-
diction when the offense is security related or arises out of an act or
omission in the performance of official duty. 6 In all other cases
the receiving State retains primary jurisdiction.257 The conflict
resolving procedure incorporated in the NATO SOFA has worked
so well that it has become the model for status of forces agreements
internationally.258 Many States, including the Warsaw Pact nations,
have considered its tenets valuable enough to adopt them.259
A proposed convention based on the NATO SOFA would
bridge a troublesome gap in international law. Increased certainty
and uniformity in the laws governing visiting military forces would
be a valuable result.260 In addition, with proper procedures utilized
in the United Nations, the convention could be opened to universal
participation by all member nations, and also could be left open to
accession by any future new nations.26
248. Id
249. Stanger, supra note 10, at 84-85.
250. See supra text accompanying note 127.
251. Baxter, supra note 233, at i.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 45-59 and 73-94.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 166-17 1.
254. See supra text accompanying note 171.
255. See supra text accompanying note 159.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 166-171.
257. See supra text accompanying note 171.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 234-235.
259. See supra text accompanying note 235.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 250-251.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 237-238.
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The deployment of the tri-partite force in Lebanon in August
and September, 1982262 continuing into 1984, recently illustrated
the current and long term necessity for such a convention. Further
impetus for implementation of a uniform convention on status of
forces is gained by an examination of the sheer numbers of visiting
force components continuously stationed throughout the world.
263
With many nations already using similar provisions for their
status of forces agreements, it appears that codification in this area
of international law is in order. A uniform convention under the
auspices of the United Nations is therefore proposed under Article
13 of the United Nations Charter, 264 which encourages the develop-
ment and codification of international law. The United States,
either alone, or with the aid of allies, should promptly introduce
such a convention for passage in the United Nations General
Assembly.
Larry E Rennet*
262. See supra text accompanying note 240.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 225-235.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 237-239.
* With heartfelt thanks to Vivian and Suzanne Renner, without whose support and
assistance this Comment could not have been completed.
31
Renner: International Law and Criminal Jurisdiction Over Visiting Armed F
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
